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Introduction
In 2001, after 9.11, the problem of Islamophobia entered the world stage, and following the 
Iraq War in 2003, the problem of “sectarian conflicts” also came to the fore. In 21st century, 
these inter-religious or inter-sectarian conflicts have attracted much negative attention, 
but it must be pointed out that there are also positive initiatives and movements toward 
rapprochement, dialogue and cooperation. This article deals with the Islamic policy of Jordan 
in the 21st century. During the 21st century, and especially after Iraq War, Jordan, known 
officially as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, has taken a unique and positive stance on its 
Islamic policy which aims at religious rapprochement. Formerly, religious rapprochement 
movements were advanced by Ulama or intellectuals in the Islamic World, but in the 
monarchy of Jordan, the king and the royal family are taking the initiative and this means it 
has political force. This article shows the religious rapprochement movement led by Jordan’s 
royal family as “religious political strategy.” However Jordan’s religious rapprochement 
movement has importance not only as political strategy but also as an illustration of Sunni 
Moderate thought. Jordan is demonstrating its leadership in religious rapprochement in the 
Islamic World, despite its relatively small size as a country. The following article begins by 
showing the conflicts as the background, and next, shows Jordan’s moderate initiatives for 
rapprochement, first in response to inter-sectarian conflicts and next, inter-religious ones.
I. Jordan in the Contemporary Map of Islamic Trend
1-1. Jordan and the Rise of Sectarian Conflicts
After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Khomeini insisted “export of revolution,” in terms 
of ideology, Shiite Revolutionism became a big threat for Sunni conservative countries 
including Jordan. At the time of the Iran-Iraq War, the perspective that a conflict would arise 
between Sunnis and Shias became commonly accepted, and the view that Iran would be a 
threat began to spread. This way of thinking is represented in the words “Shiite Crescent,” 
which was formally used for the first time by Jordanian King Abdullah II [Amos 2010: 118]. 
In an interview with the Washington Post he said: ‘If pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate 
the new Iraqi government, a new “crescent” of dominant Shiite movements or governments 
stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could emerge, alter the traditional balance of 
power between the two main Islamic sects [...]’ [Wright and Baker: 2004]. This interview was 
given just before the very first election in Iraq after the Iraq War. As a result of this election, 
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Shiites won a majority in the assembly of Iraq and the first “Shiite Arab State” came into 
being [Nasr 2007: 185–210]. Some researchers noted their doubts about the concept of “Shiite 
Crescent” [Terhalle 2007: 69–83] but there is some reality to the threat for Sunni countries, 
because of Iran’s active foreign policy such as its dispatching of the “Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards.”
After the Iraq War, especially after the bombing in Samarra, the violence of the sectarian 
conflicts escalated and started attracting attention. However it is important to understand 
that, in terms of ideology, the structure of these so-called sectarian conflicts not only pits 
Sunni against Shia but also Sunni Salafi Jihadism against Sunni Conservatism. Sunni Salafi 
Jihadism is also a big threat for Jordan. In other words, now Jordan is in the position of 
being attacked by both Shiite Revolutionalism and Sunni Salafi Jihadism. In fact, Jordan is a 
place which has “produced” some important Salafi Jihadists. One prominent example is Abu 
Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (1966–2006), who is the Jordanian leader of the Iraqi branch of al-Qa‘ida 
and precursor to the Islamic State (IS) [Brisard and Martinez 2005]. Similarly, the two most 
important radical Ulama alive today, Abu Qatada al-Filastini (b. 1960) and Abu Muhammad 
al-Maqdisi (b. 1959), are both Jordanian citizens. Jordan was also home to Muhammad 
Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–1999), for the last two decades of his life [Wagemakers 2016]. 
Moreover, Abd Allah ‘Azzam (1941–1989), some of whose ideas about jihad are held by 
current jihadist groups like al-Qaʻida, was born in Palestine under Jordanian occupation and 
migrated to Jordan when his hometown was occupied by Israel during the Six-Day War in 
1967 [Hassan 2014]. This put the Jordanian government under pressure to face their Salafi 
Jihadi ideologies and also their concrete violent jihad activities.
In the 1970s Salafism inside Jordan intensified, and after the 1990s Salafist activity 
in Jordan became violent, influenced by the return of participants in the Afghan War, the 
US army’s invasion of Holy Places in the Gulf War in 1991 and the conclusion of the peace 
agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1994 [Mickolus 1997: 554; Wiktorowicz 2001: 121]. 
One of the important characteristics of these Salafi Jihadists’ ideologies was using takfir 
against the Jordanian government and its supporters. In the 21st century, al-Zarqawi and then 
IS became a big threat for Jordan. On November 9th, 2005, suicide bombings occurred at 3 
hotels in Amman and a fourth would-be suicide bomber, Sajida Mubarak Atrous al-Rishawi, 
was arrested. These attacks killed 60 people and injured 115 others, for which al-Zarqawi later 
claimed responsibility [Wagemakers 2016: 146]. In September 2014, Jordan declared war on 
IS and sent its air force against it, and in retaliation for the capture and killing of the Jordanian 
air force pilot, Muadh al-Kasasbeh by IS, Jordan executed al-Rishawi and escalated its air 
campaign against IS [Wagemakers 2016: 146].
As we can see from the above, demonstrating its Sunni conservative ideology, Jordan 
has had to face Shiite Revolutionism and also Sunni Salafi Jihadism. Especially because of 
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the rise of Salafi Jihadism and its ideology of takfir against the Jordanian government, the 
need to reconstruct and to perform Jordan’s Sunni moderate ideology has arisen. 
1-2. Jordan and the Rise of the Religious Conflicts
The 1960s to 1970s was the era of the Islamic Revival. From the late 1970s, other religions 
also entered an era of revival, and the phase of political-ideologification of the religions 
began. As Kepel described, religious conflicts arising from the basic components of religion, 
regarding the differences between religious values or religious identities, have become bandied 
as a problem in Modern times [Kepel 1991]. From these conflicts emerged the problem of 
Islamophobia, which gradually spread, triggered by “the significant influx of Muslims into 
the West in the late 20th century, the Iranian revolution, hijackings, hostage-taking and acts of 
terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s, attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 
9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe.” [Esposito and Kalin 2011; xxii] 
Corresponding to this problem, the movement of inter-faith dialogue was raised by both 
the West and the Islamic world, especially after 9/11. From the Islamic side, Saudi Arabia 
took the initiative on inter-faith dialogue as a “great Sunni country” and the “Custodian of 
the Two Holy Mosques.” For example in June 2008, Saudi Arabian King Abdullah hosted 
an international conference gathering Muslim scholars aimed at inter-faith dialogue. The 
following month in Madrid, the king got the participation of the king of Spain, and an 
international conference on inter-faith dialogue came into reality. Then in 2011 in Vienna, 
Saudi Arabia, Spain and Austria founded the international organization named “King Abdullah 
bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue,” with the 
Holy See attending as Founding Observer. 
On the other hand, Jordan is also trying to take the initiative on inter-faith dialogue 
as this article will discuss. About 6% of Jordan’s population is Christians; they are 
predominantly Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics [Ryan 2014: 284]. The coexistence of 
Muslims and Christians in Jordan has been on the whole doing well. Taking this success as 
a foundation, Jordan’s inter-faith dialogue has a uniqueness which differs from every other 
Sunni country.
II. The Amman Message: Moderation in the Inter-Ummah Politics
2-1. Outline of the Amman Message
The Amman Message was declared on 9th November, 2004 at Amman’s al-Hashimiyyin 
Mosque by Jordan’s chief justice, Shaykh ʻIzz al-Din al-Tamimi in front of King Abdullah 
II. The Message was composed by some Ulama, the leader of whom was Prince Ghazi. He is 
a cousin of the king and the chief adviser to the king for Religious and Cultural Affairs. He 
received a Ph.D. from al-Azhar University and has the qualification of ʻalim. This message 
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insists on the disavowal of radicalism and declares the moderate way of Islam by citation of 
the Quran. This message was summarized in “the 3 points of the Amman Message” in 2005. 
The first point is to insist that it is neither possible nor permissible to declare as apostates 
any other group of Muslims who believe in God, and His Messenger, the pillars of faith, and 
the five pillars of Islam, and do not deny any necessarily self-evident tenet of the religion. On 
the first point, the 8 jurisprudences, which include the four Sunni Madhahib (Hanafi, Maliki, 
Shafi‘i, and Hanbali), the two Shi‘i Madhahib (Ja‘afari and Zaydi), the Ibadi and the Zahiri, 
all insist that such persons are Muslims. They also insist that whoever subscribes to the Ashari 
creed, ‘real’ Sufism and ‘true’ Salafism is also Muslim. The Message forbids takfir against all 
of the above. 
The second point insists that every difference among all the jurisprudences is a minor 
problem and should be accepted. And the third point insists that a fatwa should be issued only 
by one who has the qualification of knowledge. 
This “3 point Amman Message” was submitted by Jordanian King Abdullah II to the 
OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference1) conference and other conferences from 
2005 to 2006, and the endorsements to this message amount to 552 from political leaders, 
religious leaders and Islamic thinkers from all over the Islamic world beyond the sects or 
jurisprudences.2 
2-2. Legitimacy of Jordan’s Inter-Sects Rapprochement
As we see in the Amman Message, Jordan, without sectarian conflicts inside the country, is 
aggressively transmitting the message aiming for Inter-sect rapprochement. In Jordan’s Inter-
sect rapprochement policy, there are some characteristics to its legitimacy. 
The first characteristic, the emphasis of the noble lineage of the royal Hashemite 
family can be mentioned. This is the citation from the main text of the Amman Message; 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has embraced the path of promoting the true luminous 
image of Islam, halting the accusations against it and repelling the attacks upon it. This is in 
accordance with the inherited spiritual and historical responsibility carried by the Hashemite 
monarchy, honored as direct descendants of the Prophet (Al al-bayt) […] who carried the 
message [MABDA 2009: 4]. What deserves special mention regarding this lineage is that the 
Jordanian Hashemite family belongs to the line of Hassan, the son of Ali [Sulṭān 2009: 562]. 
This means that the royal family compare favorably with Shiite noble lineages. This is one of 
the advantages or characteristics of Jordan’s Inter-sect rapprochement policy compared to that 
of Saudi Arabia or of other countries. 
1 It was renamed as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in 2011.
2 The list of all endorsement: <http://ammanmessage.com/grand-list-of-endorsements-of-the-amman-
message-and-its-three-points/> (last accessed 12/1/2017)
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Jordan also has legitimacy as the custodian of Jerusalem (Al-Quds). From when it 
occupied Jerusalem in 1948 during the first Arab-Israeli War to 1967, Jordan governed the 
West Bank of the Jordanian River. The first king of Jordan, Abdullah I administrated the West 
Bank and tried to make Jordan’s legitimacy official in Jerusalem [Katz 2005: 54–75]. From 
the 1950s, Jordan started the restoration of Haram Sharif, especially of the Dome of the Rock. 
Jordan lost her sovereignty over the West Bank in 1967, but the restoration continued after 
that. For example in the 1980s and also in 1994 the previous king, Hussein, restored the Dome 
of Rock and its golden dome. In 1969, the Minbar of al-Aqsa Mosque, which was set on fire 
by a radical Zionist, was also restored by King Hussein and this restoration was taken over by 
the present king, Abdullah II. The Jordanian government acts as the custodian or guardian of 
Jerusalem, the third Holy Place of Islam. All this confirms Jordan’s legitimacy to claim “true 
Islam” in its inter-sect rapprochement policy or Islamic Moderate thought.
2-3. Importance of Jordan’s Political Strategy
Jordan is a small country surrounded by Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Palestine and Israel, 
therefore its stability depends on the stability of the region the whole. Such a moderate 
approach, like publishing the Amman Message and making a consensus in the Islamic World 
by it, is one step towards bringing about stability in the Middle East, even if the message can 
do nothing to ease the crises of civilization in the region.
The Amman Message defends the world Muslim community against Islamic Radicalism, 
Takfirism, and Sunni Salafi Jihadism. However the message is not only for defense but also 
for taking the initiative among the Sunni Conservative countries actively in the aspect of 
religious rapprochement. Jordan’s legitimacy for inter-sect rapprochement is supported by its 
original characteristics as mentioned before. For example, Saudi Arabia, in which Wahhabism 
predominates, isn’t concerned about its lineage, and acts as the custodian of the two Holy 
Cities, Makkah and Madina. On the other hand, Morocco has a royal family belonging to Ahl 
al-Bayt, and it also exhibits its influence on the problem of Jerusalem. Among those Sunni 
countries, Jordan makes use of the original legitimacy of its ideology in Sunni world and is 
actively taking the initiative on religious policy strategically. 
Although this message is a political strategy of the Jordanian royal family, it has 
importance as a new trend of Sunni moderate thought in the 21st century. The next section 
shows the message’s importance in Islamic thought.
2-4. Importance in Islamic Thought
The Amman Message can be put in the trend of the movement of so-called Tqrib or Taqarub 
in Arabic. Brunner [2004] defined this movement as “the aspiration toward ecumenical 
rapprochement of the denominations” and continued as follows: 
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It (Tqrib or Taqarub) was expressed for the first time at the end of the nineteenth 
century in the course of the general pan-Islamic tendencies that were in their 
formative stages at the time. Starting with these initially isolated events, inter 
confessional cooperation was first manifested in an organized form in the Islamic 
congress movement of the 1920s and 30s. Somewhat later, individual groupings 
specifically established for this purpose started to appear. Usually bearing 
programmatic names, their publications offered a forum for dialogue to Shiite and 
Sunnis alike. [Brunner 2004: 3]
As Brunner [2004] explains in detail, the Taqrib movement was mainly lead by the 
relationship between al-Azhar and Shiite clergy in the 20th century. What deserves attention 
about this movement is that Mahmud Shaltut, the Shaykh of al-Azhar in those days, issued 
a fatwa in 1959 as follows: The Ja‘fari school of thought, which is also known as al-Shia 
al-Imamiyya al-Ithna ‘Ashariyya [i.e., Twelvers], is a school of thought that is religiously 
correct to follow in worship as other schools of thought [Harverson 2013: 507]. Before 
Shaltut, no Sunni legal scholar of rank had gone as far to recognize Shiism as a completely 
equal denomination [Brunner 2004: 290]. Therefore this was a very historic fatwa in the 
realm of Sunni thought. As a further Taqrib movement, Ibadism was also incorporated into the 
category of Islam at the end of the 20th century. 
The Amman Message presented at the beginning of the 21st century mentioned the 8 
Islamic jurisprudences and recognized them all as true Islam. In this point, this message can 
be grasped as a development of Shaltut’s fatwa and the progress of the Taqrib movement. 
Moreover, the Amman Message does correspond to the needs of this 21st century’s situation, 
in this time of intensifying sectarian conflicts. The forbidding of takfir and fatwas without 
qualification is one of the edicts corresponding to the modern situation of the threats by 
leaders of Sunni Salafi Jihadism like al-Zarqawi against Sunni governments and Shiism. 
Sunnis, officially Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama‘a, stress the importance of Sunna, the 
verbally transmitted record of the teachings, deeds and sayings, silent permissions (or 
disapprovals) of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, and Jama‘a, agreement of Ummah or agreed 
by the majority of the Ummah. The background to forbidding takfir in the Amman Message is 
that takfir itself is the cause of the splitting of the Ummah. This message tries to incorporate 
the Sunni minorities like the Ash‘arite school of theology, Sufism and also Salafism into 
Jama‘a, against Takfirism. Moreover, this message even includes Shiism in this Jama‘a and 
this means that it really shows the breadth of Jama‘a. This is the very originality of Jordan’s 
Sunni moderate thought. 
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III. A Common Word: Moderation in Inter-Religious Dialogues
3-1. Outline of “A Common Word” initiative
Jordan’s approach to the inter-religious dialogues is represented in “A Common Word 
Initiative.” The expression “A Common Word (Kalima Sawā’)” derives from the Quran (3: 
64), “Say: O People of Scripture! Come to a common word between us and you: that we shall 
worship none but God, and that we shall ascribe no partner unto Him, and that none of us 
shall take others for lords beside God.”  [MABDA 2012: 21]
After the announcement of the Amman Message, in 2005 “the Amman Interfaith 
Message” was published and this became the basis of the Jordan’s inter-religious dialogue. In 
September 2006, the news that Pope Benedict XVI had spoken about the violence of Islam in 
a lecture in German was reported prominently and this provoked a big controversy. Regarding 
this, one month later, Prince Ghazi and 37other major Muslim figures from around the world 
made an “open letter to the Pope,” which pointed out some mistakes in the lecture and called 
for interfaith dialogue and understanding. Finally, these attempts came to fruition in an open 
letter, the title of which is “A Common Word Between Us and You (Kalima Sawā‘ Bayna-
nā wa Bayna-kum),” which was written by Prince Ghazi and 138 other Ulama [Ghazi 2010: 
3]. This article, named Jordan’s interfaith initiative, was represented by this open letter as “A 
Common Word Initiative.”
“A Common Word” mentions especially the relationship between Islam and Christianity. 
It emphasises the shared aspects of Islam and Christianity, such as ‘the love of God’ and ‘the 
love of neighbor,’ quoting the Quran and the Bible’s New Testament. “A Common Word” was 
uploaded to the Internet and got many signatures in its favor from distinguished people from 
various fields.3 This initiative is actively against the criticism that Islam is violent religion.
In response to this inter-religious rapprochement approach, in 2007, Yale Divinity 
School expressed its approval of it, by the statement “Loving God and Neighbor Together: A 
Christian Response to A Common Word between Us and You” with more than 300 signatures 
by Christian bishops, priests or other Christians [Volf, Cumming and Yarrington 2010: 51].
3-2. Characteristics of Jordan’s Inter-faith Dialogue
There are some advantages in Jordan’s Inter-faith Dialogue. Jordan has a minority population 
of Christians as mentioned. Jordan is an Islamic country but Christians in Jordan have been 
enjoying freedom in their religious life. Jordan emphasizes the success of coexistence between 
Muslims and Christians inside of the country. In the “Amman Interfaith Message” submitted 
in 2005, there are descriptions like the following: 
3 The list of signatories: <http://www.acommonword.com/signatories/> and  <http://www.acommonword.
com/sigtype/newsig/> (last accessed 12/1/2017)
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H.M. King Abdullah II’s [interfaith] message did not come out of a void. The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been blessed with one of the most harmonious 
religious experiences in the world. […] Christians in Jordan hold a special place at 
all levels of Jordanian life and are fiercely patriotic. Historically speaking, there is 
no country in the world with more religious harmony, camaraderie and goodwill than 
Jordan at either the government or the popular level. In the Parliament Christians 
have 9 seats reserved for them out of a total of 110 seats (i.e. over 8%, compared 
with their real population of 2.5%); out of a cabinet of about 24 ministers, they 
always hold 1–3 ministries; they hold top posts in the Army, the Intelligence, the 
Judiciary, the Royal Court, the media, the educational institutes and at every level of 
government administration. They are amongst the largest landowners and generate 
close to 10% of the county’s private sector economy.  The Christians Churches enjoy 
their own oﬃcial council and their own laws whereby they determine their own 
aﬀairs. Moreover, Jordan oﬃcially protects and promotes their Holy Sites [MABDA 
2005: 17–20].
The Jordanian government also protects sacred places of Christianity and ancient 
historical relics of Christianity inside of Jordan. In Madaba, a town located about 30 km south-
west of Amman, we can find some of the archaeological relics of Christianity. The most famous 
one is “the Madaba Map,” which is a 6th-century mosaic map of Jerusalem, now inside of the 
church of Saint George. Another example is Al-Maghtas, the Baptism site, which is considered 
to be the original location of the baptism of Jesus, located some 50 km west of Amman beside 
the River Jordan. After the signing of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty in 1994, the restoration 
of the area was started under the initiative of Prince Ghazi and the archaeological excavations 
were sponsored by UNESCO. After these significant archeological discoveries were made, a 
UNESCO heritage site was made in 2015 on the eastern bank of the River Jordan.
At this Holy site, the construction of new churches (the Anglican, the Armenian, the 
Coptic and the Catholic churches and the Russian Pilgrims’ House) is now on going and 
projects like this are operated by the Baptism Site Commission, an independent board of 
trustees appointed by King Abdullah II and Prince Ghazi chairs the commission.4 King 
Abdullah II and Prince Ghazi invited three Popes, Orthodox Patriarchs, and other visitors 
(Baptist, Armenian, Anglican, Coptic and Belgium) to al-Maghtas, staged to show authority 
as a guardian of Christianity.
Moreover, from the 1950s to the 1960s, under the reign of the previous king, Hussein, 
Jordan repaired the Holy Sepulture Church in Jerusalem, which was at that time had almost 
4 From the official Web site of this commission “The Baptism Site of Jesus Christ” <http://www.
baptismsite.com/about-us/> (last accessed 12/1/2017)
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completely collapsed [Katz 2005: 102]. Added to Jordan’s contribution to Al-Aqsa Mosque 
and the Dome of the Rock, Jordan is upholding its role as the custodian of the Holy Islamic 
and also the Holy Christian sites of Jerusalem. This is one of the unique characteristics and 
advantages of Jordan, quite unlike Saudi Arabia. 
Such activities support Jordan’s Islamic legitimacy and also guarantee its inter-religious 
rapprochement policy represented its “A Common Word” initiative. Jordan’s advantage in 
its religious rapprochement policy is that it represents both Islam and Christianity and shows 
its fairness. This is different from Saudi Arabia, whose religious rapprochement policy is to 
represent only Islam. 
3-3. Importance of Jordan’s inter-faith dialogue 
Jordan’s inter-faith dialogue, represented by “A Common Word,” is to urge coexistence, 
dialogue or cooperation between Muslims and Christians. This is against Islamophobia and 
also so-called Islamic Radicalism. Interestingly, the “A Common Word” initiative is not only 
for defending Islam but also for insisting actively that Islam is a religion of love; love of 
God and love of neighbors, all over the world. In addition, both The Amman Message and 
A Common Word emphasize the common ground shared by sects and religions, and this is a 
very important trend of Islamic moderate thought in the Modern times. 
This initiative is supported by the concrete practices of Jordan, such as coexisting with 
Christians or protecting the Holy Places or the heritages of Christianity. This is the uniqueness 
of Jordan’s interfaith dialogue. Although other Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
Morocco are also trying to take the initiative on this moderate Islamic trend, Jordan has shown 
that it can demonstrate its ability in its own sphere. It means that, inside Sunni Conservatism, 
there are competitions among Sunni moderate ideologies which are strategically set forth by 
Sunni states. 
Conclusion
In 21st century, Jordan has manifested its religious aspect in a moderate way. Under attack by 
Shiite Revolutionism, Salafi Jihadism and Islamophobia, in such a difficult situation, Jordan 
is trying to promote moderate Islam. This is Jordan’s diplomatic strategy, but this is also in 
accord with the trend of reviving Sunni moderate thought. Especially because of the rise of 
Sunni Salafi Jihadism, Sunni Conservative countries such as Jordan have begun to show their 
own Sunni ideology. However, while Sunni Conservative countries show the same Sunni 
ideology, Jordan’s Sunni ideology is supported by its Hashemite royal family, descendants of 
the Prophet Muhammad, and by their contribution as a custodian of Jerusalem. Not only the 
king, but all the members of the royal family from Ahl al-Bayt, show its Islamic legitimacy 
and constitute its religious moderate ideology. 
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In the aspects of Inter-faith dialogue, Jordan uses its advantages as the home of “the birth 
place of Christianity” and its Christian population. Its legitimacy is guaranteed by its policy 
of protecting the sacred places of Christianity, and Churches or ancient sites and treasures of 
Christianity inside Jordan and in Jerusalem. The Islam-Christianity Rapprochement policy stands 
against Jihadism, which harms Christians, and also against Islamophobia in all over the world. 
Jordan is a small country but represents both Islam and Christianity in its own context and takes 
the initiative in inter-faith dialogue and the trend of moderate Islam in an era of sectarian conflicts 
and the clash of religions based civilizations. Jordan’s aspiration to be a leader of moderate Islam 
is vitally connected with the very raison d’etat of the kingdom and its survival.
※ This work is part of the achievements of the NIHU Area Studies Project for Modern 
Middle East.
※※ This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI (Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Research Fellow) 
Grant Number 16J06871.
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